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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
I. The National Environmental Policy Act
The adverse affects of an industrialized society are everywhere
present. One need only visit the beaches in Santa Barbara,' breathe the
air in Los Angeles2 or look at the San Francisco Bay3 to realize that
the environment is bearing a substantial burden in support of progress.
How long the environment can withstand this burden without becoming
uninhabitable is only a matter of conjecture.4  It is relatively certain,
however, that if nothing is done to curb the present rate of environ-
mental degradation the consequences will be intolerable. 5
The public has only recently recognized the critical importance of
the environmental problem. This belated recognition, however, has
generated widespread concern for environmental protection and has
led to the establishment of a considerable body of "environmental law."
Until recently, protective environmental litigation6 was restricted
to nuisance actions,7 trespass actions" or actions involving the construc-
tion of statutes that contained some environment-protecting provisions. 9
1. See Santa Barbara v. Mally, I BNA ENV. REP. Current Decisions 1285
(9th Cir. Apr. 21, 1970). See also NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1969, at 33; id., June 16,
1969, at 60.
2. See Los Angeles Water & Power v. Los Angeles Air Pollution Control Dist.,
1 BNA ENV. REP. Current Decisions 1580 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 9, 1970).
3. See Note, A Challenge to the California Water Plan, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 759
(1970). See also New York Times, Jan. 20, 1971, at 31, col. 1-4, 54 col. 2-3 (city ed.).
4. Gloomy predictions include the coming of an ice age within the relatively
near future, the inundation of coastal cities as a result of melting ice caps, shortage of
oxygen, contaminated food and a dangerous abundance of radiation. These predictions
are not universally accepted as being well founded, but the fact remains that there is
a limited supply of natural resources, and if they are exhausted the earth will eventually
be uninhabitable. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY, FIrST ANNUAL REPORT,
40, 66, 95-7, 132-35, 141 (1970); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK §§ 1.27-.38 (Cal.
Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. See also S. REP. No.
296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1969).
5. HANDBOOK § 1.34-.38.
6. "No authority has as yet defined 'environmental litigation."' Sive, Some
Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614 n.7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sive].
7. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 89, at 611, § 90, at
612-13 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See also Note, Water Pollution
Control in Mississippi, 41 Miss. L.J. 351 (1970); Note, Water Quality Standards in
Private Nuisance, 79 YALE L.J. 102 (1970).
8. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, § 6.23.
9. E.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. H8 661-62 (1964);
Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964); Federal Power Act § 10(a),
In the early cases, degradation of the environment did not alone create
a cause of action. The environmental lawyer was therefore limited to
applying old legal theories to new factual dilemmas, a situation that was
not conducive to reaching satisfactory results.
In recognition of the present environmental problems, the public
concern for the protection of the environment, and the somewhat in-
adequate foundation of environmental law, Congress enacted the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).1° Its purpose, as
stated in section 2, is to:
16 U.S.C. § 757 (1964); Anadramous Fish Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 757 (1964); Multiple
Use Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-31 (1960).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. V, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPA]. The text
of sections 4321 through 4335 follows:
§ 4321. "Congressional declaration of purpose.
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to pro-
mote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecologi-
cal systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council
on Environmental Quality.
SUBCHAPTER I-POLICIES AND GOALS
§ 4331. "Congressional declaration of national environmental policy. (a) The Con-
gress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all
components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of popu-
lation growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation,
and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical im-
portance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Govern-
ment, in cooperation with State and Local governments, and other concerned public
and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial
and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present
and future generations of Americans. (b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in
this chapter, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to
improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end
that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-
tion, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum at-
tainable recycling of depletable resources.
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declare a- national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the environment.
§ 4332. "Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of information; recommenda-
tions; international and national coordination of efforts. The Congress authorizes and
directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws
of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's en-
vironment;(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter T1 of this chapter,
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic
and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall con-
sult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies
of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State,
and local agencies, which are authorized to developr and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accom-
pany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources;
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind's world environment;
(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and
individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing
the quality of the environment;
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and develop-
ment of resource-oriented projects; and
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by subehapter
February 1971]
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment . . . and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality."
To implement its purpose, the NEPA declares that it is the national
policy to use "all practicable means. . . to create and maintain condi-
tions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony."' 12
To effect this policy, the NEPA requires:
[T]o the fullest extent possible . . .the policies, regulations, and
the public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act.' 3
The NEPA, essentially an agency-regulating statute, also requires
that all agencies combine the use of natural and social sciences with en-
vironmental factors when making decisions that may have an impact on
the environment.' 4 Further, section 102(2)(C) requires all agencies
to include in every proposal for federal actions that may have a signifi-
cant impact on the environment a detailed statement relating the effects
of the action on the environment and alternatives to the proposed ac-
tion.' 5 Before making this statement, the responsible agency official
must consult with any other agency having particular expertise con-
cerning the environmental effects of the proposed action.' 6 Finally, the
II of this chapter.
§ 4333. "Conformity of administrative procedures to national environmental policy.
All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present statutory authority,
administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the purpose of de-
termining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit
full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this chapter and shall propose to
the President not later than July 1, 1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring
their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures
set forth in this chapter.
§ 4334. "Other statutory obligations of agencies.
Nothing in section 4332 or 4333 of this title shall in any way affect the specific
statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of
environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State
agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or
certification of any other Federal or State agency.
§ 4334. "Efforts supplemental to existing authorizations. The policies and goals set
forth in this chapter are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations
of Federal agencies."
11. NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. V, 1970).
12. Id. § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
13. Id. § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
14. Id. § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A). See text accompanying note
82 infra.
15. Id. §§ 102(2)(C)(i)-(v), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v). See also Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, Interim Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Interim Guidelines].
16. NEPA § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (Supp. V, 1970). See also
Memorandum from Timothy Atkeson, General Counsel, to All Federal Agency Liai-
son Officers on Implementation of Section 102(2)(c) of National Environmental
Policy Act.
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statute requires that all agencies bring their own policies and procedures
into conformity with the policies and procedures of the NEPA.
17
The Council on Environmental Quality, also established pursuant
to section 2 of the act,"' is an executive agency responsible for advising
the President on environmental policy in accordance with the NEPA.' 9
It is likely that the findings of this agency will constitute a persuasive
source of environmental law, since this agency is devoted solely to the
development of environmental policy.20
With its strong policy statements and stringent procedural re-
quirements, the NEPA should prove a valuable addition to existing en-
vironmental law. It is the first statute solely devoted to the preserva-
tion of the environment and applies to all federal agencies 21 and all
forms of environmental pollution. The NEPA also should have a salu-
tary effect on environmentally related statutes by reinforcing their en-
vironment-protecting provisions. 22 It may even affect traditional no-
tions of what constitutes a private nuisance.23  It should be noted, how-
ever, that the NEPA does not set forth any enforcement provisions to
insure compliance; nor does it state that noncompliance is unlawful.
Consequently, the NEPA's efficacy will depend in part on its
construction by the courts. If the NEPA is regarded merely as preca-
tory legislation, it obviously will be of little value. If, on the other hand,
17. NEPA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (Supp. V, 1970). Alth6ugh section 103 al-
lows agencies until July 1, 1971, to bring their authority into conformity with the
NEPA, Executive Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970), followed by the
Council on Environmental Quality's Interim Guidelines, ordered all agencies to review
their present authority and submit to the council results of the review along with
proposals for bringing their authority into conformity with the Act by Sept. 1, 1970.
18. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
19. NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (Supp. V, 1970).
20. Id. § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342. See also Interim Guidelines. It should be noted
that the functions of the Council on Environmental Quality have been modified as a
result of Executive Reorganization Plan No. 3, § 2(5), to the extent that the new
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will "conduct investigations, studies, surveys,
research, and analyses relating to ecological systems," a function which the Council on
Environmental Quality was previously assigned under NEPA § 204(5). [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2995.
21. "Because of the [NEPA's] legislative history, the regulatory activities of the
Federal environmental protection agencies (e.g., the Federal Water Quality Administra-
tion of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) are not deemed actions
which require the preparation of an environmental statement under section 102(2)
(C) of the Act." Interim Guidelines, supra note 15, § 4. It does not appear
that these agencies are exempted from complying with the policy set forth in the NEPA.
Functions of the Federal Water Quality Administration and the National Air Pollu-
tion Control Administration have been transferred to the Environmental Protection
Agency. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(1), 2(3), [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2996. The Water Quality Control Administration has been abolished.
id. § 6(1).
22. See note 13 supra. See also S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969).
23. See note 154 infra.
February 1971] RETROACTIVWTY OF NEPA
the NEPA is interpreted as a congressional mandate giving rise to
justiciable rights capable of being enforced, it will contribute signifi-
cantly to environmental law, since violation of the NEPA will constitute
a new and independent cause of action, not limited to a particular as-
pect of the environment. 4
The NEPA will realize its full potential as an addition to existing
environmental law only if it can be applied retroactively, for retroactive
application would signify that the NEPA is not limited to a preventa-
tive role, but performs a creative function as well. The courts, how-
ever, have not yet conclusively established whether the NEPA can
be enforced and, if so, whether it can be applied retroactively. Nor
have they established what enforcement of the NEPA entails. Both
enforcement of the NEPA and its retroactive application raises serious
constitutional questions which will undoubtedly be given close judicial
scrutiny in the future.
I. Enforcement of the NEPA as a Justiciable Right
A. Violations as a Legal Wrong
In order to enforce the NEPA, it is first necessary to determine
that noncompliance with the provisions of the NEPA constitutes a
legal wrong within the meaning of section 10(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). zs That section provides that "[a] person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected . . .
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof."2 6 Whether noncompliance with the NEPA is
a legal wrong depends on the constitutionality of judicial enforcement
of policy. In other words, would it be a usurpation of legislative power
for a court to declare that noncompliance with the provisions of the
NEPA is a justiciable legal wrong, notwithstanding that the NEPA does
not set forth any enforcement provisions or any provisions stating
that noncompliance is unlawful?2"
The case law supports the conclusion that judicial enforcement
of statutory policy statements, despite the absence of express statutory
authority, does not constitute a usurpation of legislative power 2 s En-
forcement of legislative policy, however, requires a finding by the
court that: (1) there is a lawfully imposed duty to act and (2) the
duty was intended to be enforceable.
24. See note 9 supra. See also S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1969).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1968).
26. Id.
27. See note 10 supra.
28. E.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S.
579 (1957); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1943); Virginia R.R. v. System Fed'n, 300
U.S. 515 (1936); School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902);
Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Tailway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1929).
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As early as Marbury v. Madison,29 the Supreme Court began im-
plementing policy by declaring that the courts could direct the per-
formance of statutory duties on the ground that such power is implicitly
conferred by the Constitution. The decision in Marbury further stated:
where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear
that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to re-
sort to the laws of his country for a remedy. 30
It appears then, that in order for the NEPA to be judicially enforceable,
it must be shown that the NEPA creates a specific duty, and that in-
dividual rights depend upon the performance of that duty.
More recent cases support by analogy the contention that the
NEPA does create a specific duty, and that individual rights do depend
on its performance. In Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Railway Clerks,81
the Supreme Court stated:
If Congress intended that the statute as thus construed, should be
enforced, the courts would encounter no difficulty in fulfilling its
purpose. .. . The definite prohibition which Congress inserted in
the act can not therefore be overridden in the view that Congress
intended it to be ignored. As the prohibition was appropriate to
the aim of Congress, and is capable of enforcement, the conclu-
sion must be that enforcement was contemplated.32
The statute in question in Railway Clerks was the Railway Labor Act,33
which provided that the appointment of collective bargaining agents
by each party "shall" be made independently and without coercion or
interference from the other party. There was no express enforcement
provision in the Railway Labor Act and for that reason the defendants
argued that the act was unenforceable against them. The lower court
countered this argument by stating:
It is the duty of this court, wherever possible, to hold acts of Con-
gress virile rather than sterile . . . and, where a right is claimed
under an act of Congress, to give it effective protection, especially
where those who contest this right do so on arbitrary or interested
grounds. . . [The] difficulty arises. . . out of the doubt raised
by the defendants as to whether Congress has merely stated a
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. Id. at 166.
31. 281 U.S. 548 (1929). See cases cited note 28 supra.
32. 281 U.S. at 568-69.
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970). Section 2 pro-
vides:
"Representatives, for the purposes of this act, shall be designated by the respective
parties in such manner as may be provided in their corporate organization, or unin-
corporated association, or by other means of collective action, without interference,
influence, or coercion exercised by either party over the self-organization or designa-
tion of representatives by the other."
Compare the use of "shall" in Railway Labor Act with that in the NEPA § 102
(2) (c) at note 10 supra.
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principle, without establishing it as a right, that doubt I believe it my
duty to resolve in favor of congressional virility.34
Whether a statute, not expressly enforceable, has created a spe-
cific and enforceable duty depends on congressional intent. In the
NEPA, the requisite congressional intent is found in its legislative his-
tory:
A statement of national policy for the environment-like other ma-
jor declarations-is in large measure concerned with principle
rather than detail; with an expression of broad national goals rather
than narrow and specific procedure for implementation. But, if
goals and principles are to be effective, they must be capable of
being applied in action. [Senate Bill] 1075 thus incorporates cer-
tain "action forcing" provisions which are designed to assure that
all federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the challenge of
a better environment. 35
The "action forcing" provisions referred to include the "all practi-
cable means" and "fullest extent possible" clauses found in sections 101
and 102 of the NEPA.36  These clauses are intended "to provide all
agencies and all federal officials with a legislative mandate and a re-
sponsibility to consider the consequences of their actions on the en-
vironment. '37  This mandate includes the requirement that agency ac-
tions be conducted in the interest of preserving and enhancing the en-
vironment.3 8 It also equips all agencies claiming a lack of environmen-
tal regulatory authority with that authority and the responsibility to
exercise it. '
A second source indicating that the NEPA was intended to be en-
forced is the Interim Guidelines,40 promulgated by the Council on En-
34. Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Railway Clerks, 25 F. Supp. 873, 875 (S.D.
Tex. 1928), aff'd, 33 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 548 (1929). But see
Pennsylvania Fed'n v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 U.S. 203 (1924).
35. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). It should be noted that in
the original bill (S. 1075), the NEPA was to contain the guarantee that "each person
has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment." CONF. REP.
No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2751,
2768. See generally Note, Constitutional Right of Environment, 56 VA. L. REv. 458
(1970). Instead, the NEPA reads: "The Congress recognizes that each person should
enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." NEPA § 101(c), 42
U.S.C. § 4331(c) (Supp. V, 1970). The Conference Committee explains that the
"compromise language was adopted because of doubt on the part of the House Con-
ferees with respect to the legal scope of the original Senate provision." CONF. REP. No.
765, supra, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2768-69. See generally Yanna-
cone, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENv. L. REv. 8 (1970).
36. See note 10 supra.
37. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1969).
38. 115 CONG. REC. 12,114 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1969).
39. Id.
40. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
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vironmental Quality pursuant to Executive Order 11514. 41  The In-
terim Guidelines implement the procedural aspects of the NEPA by
ordering all agencies to establish procedures enabling them to comply
with the NEPA requirements.42 The Interim Guidelines direct federal
agencies to consult with other agencies having expertise in environmen-
tal problems that may apply to proposed actions,4 3 and specify which
agency actions are subject to NEPA control:
(a) "Actions" include but are not limited to:
(i) Recommendations or reports relating to legislation and ap-
propriations;
(ii) Projects and continuing activities;
-Directly undertaken by Federal agencies;
-Supported in whole or in part through Federal contracts,
grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assistance;
-Involving a Federal lease, permit, license, certificate or other
entitlement for use;
(iii) Policy-and procedure-making.44
The manifestation of legislative intent and the requirements of
the Interim Guidelines seem to satisfy the Marbury and Railway Clerks
test for enforcement of a specific duty where no express enforcement
provisions are provided by the statute. In one of the few cases that has
interpreted the NEPA, Zabel v. Tabb," the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers had authority and a
duty under the NEPA (and other statutes) to deny a permit for a
dredge-and-fill project. In that case the plaintiffs applied for and were
denied a permit to dredge and fill the Boca Ciega Bay in Florida.
They claimed that the Army Corps of Engineers lacked authority to
deny the permit, because the Corps' authority only extended to projects
interfering with navigation, flood control or power production, none
of which were at issue in Zabel. The court rebutted this argument by
declaring that the Corps' authority had been extended to cover projects
such as the plaintiffs:
When the House Report and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 are considered together with the Fish and Wildlife Co-
ordination Act and its interpretations, there is no doubt that the
Secretary [of the Army] can refuse on conservation grounds to
grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act.46
Although Zabel does not expressly say that the NEPA can be used
41. Id. at 4247. The Council on Environmental Quality has recently proposed
revised Guidelines which state even more explicitly that NEPA policy, as well as pro-
cedure, is to be enforced. 36 Fed. Reg. 1398 (1971).
42. Interim Guidelines, supra note 15, § 13.
43. Id. § 2.
44. Id. § 5.
45. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 BNA ENV. REP.
Current decisions 1082 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1970).
46. Id. at 214.
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as sole authority for denying a permit, it does establish that the NEPA
can contribute to environmental law at least in a supplementary ca-
pacity. In this respect the decision is similar to the ruling in West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co.4 That case
involved an attempt by the defendants to secure rights to build roads
over public land in order to facilitate the removal of coal from mines
they planned to operate. The defendants had rights to remove gas
from the land, and plaintiffs suit was brought to limit the defendant's
activity to gas removal. The district court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion on the grounds that a permit allowing the construction of the roads
would violate the policy of the NEPA and the Multiple Use Act.4"
In Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett,49 the NEPA
was given a much narrower construction than was given in either
Zabel or Virginia Highlands. The plaintiffs in the Bartlett case sought
to enjoin the defendants from constructing a highway near a trout
stream because of the adverse effects the highway would have on the
stream. The court denied an injunction stating:
A requirement that the Secretary of Transportation must make in-
dependent and affirmative evaluations of all phases of the multi-
tude of State secondary highway projects relative to their impact
on the environment not only would place a staggering burden on the
Secretary but would also cause him to duplicate state investiga-
tions and determinations. The purpose of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 is laudatory and urgently necessary,
but I am satisfied that Congress did not intend it to necessitate sec-
retarial action of the import urged by the plaintiffs.50
The court in Bartlett clearly misconstrued the NEPA, adopting,
contrary to the intent of Congress, an "excessively narrow" construc-
tion of the act 5 in order to allow the Department of Transportation to
47. Civil No. 70-82-E (N.D.W. Va., June 2, 1970).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 528-31 (1964). Section 529 provides: "In the administration
of the national forests due consideration shall be given to the relative values of the
various resources in particular areas. The establishment and maintenance of areas of
wilderness are consistent with the purposes and provisions ... of this title."
In Virginia Highlands, the wilderness concept of the public land in question was
a key issue in the case. The court decided that coal mining and road building were
inconsistent with the wilderness concept and thus would be in violation of the Multiple
Use Act.
49. 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
50. Id. at 249.
51. "It is the intent of the conferees that the provision 'to the fullest extent pos-
sible' shall not be used by any federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with
the directives set out in section 102. Rather the language in section 102 is intended to
assure that all agencies of the Federal Government shall comply with the directives set
out in said section 'to the fullest extent possible,' under their statutory authorizations
and that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing stat-
utory authorization to avoid compliance." CONF. RaP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
9-10 (1969), in [19693 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2751, 2770.
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avoid compliance. Perhaps it would not be "practicable" for the Sec-
retary of Transportation to have the "staggering burden" of inspecting
all secondary highways, but if these highways are to receive federal
funds and, as the court contended, are to be inspected, then the persons
in charge of the projects are under a duty to comply with the provi-
sions of the NEPA. There need be no duplication of effort, but the
state official that inspects the project is still bound under section 101(a)
of the NEPA to use "all practical means" to comply. with the policy
of the act.5
2
In view of the legislative history of the NEPA, and the construc-
tion given it in the few cases dealing with the subject, it can be con-
cluded that violations of the NEPA create justiciable legal wrongs. Ex-
actly whose individual rights are involved and what "enforcement" will
encompass, however, are still unsettled questions.
B. Standing Under the NEPA
To whom enforcement is available is simply a question of who has
standing to sue under the NEPA. Section 10(a) of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) limits standing in suits involving agency actions
to "aggrieved parties," parties who have suffered a "legal wrong because
of agency action, or [who have been] adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Assum-
ing that noncompliance with the NEPA is a "legal wrong" within the
meaning of the APA, it must be determined who is an "aggrieved party"
as a result of the wrong.
The concept of "aggrieved party" under section 10 of the APA
has been interpreted in several recent cases. In Association of Data
Processing Service v. Camp,53 the Supreme Court ruled that a two-
pronged test should be applied:
1) [The complainant must show he has suffered] an injury in fact,
economic or otherwise.
2) The interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must]
be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.54
Since the aggrieved party's injury need not be economic, it is arguable
that harm to the environment would provide the basis for the requisite
"injury in fact." This contention is supported by the decision in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission,55 which
held that injury may include "aesthetic, conservational and recreational"
52. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970). See text accom-
panying note 41 supra.
53. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
54. Id. at 152-53.
55. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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harm.56 In that case the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction
of a power plant on the Hudson River in New York, on grounds that
the project would unlawfully interfere with their interest in preserv-
ing the area for recreational purposes. The federal district court
held that the proof of environmental damage justified the granting of
equitable relief even though plaintiffs had not demonstrated direct pe-
cuniary loss. 5 7
In an action based on the provisions of the NEPA, noncompli-
ance resulting in injury to the environment should be held "an injury
in fact" under the Data Processing test to a party concerned with the
protection of the environment. Since the NEPA seeks to protect the
environment,5" a party with similar goals should have an interest "ar-
guably within the zone of interests to be protected" by the act. Stand-
ing to sue under the NEPA is thus feasible. The only limitation im-
posed is that the plaintiff prove to the court that his interest is suffi-
ciently linked to the environmental damage in question to constitute
an injury in fact.
Most NEPA cases to date have granted standing under the au-
thority of Data Processing and Scenic Hudson, 9 and illustrate that an
injury in fact includes noncompliance with the NEPA by a federal
agency or federally-supported project with resulting damage to marine
life,6" plant life,6 range animals (reindeer),6 2 natural beauty6" and
recreation.64 In all of these cases the plaintiffs had a tangible interest
in the location they sought to protect. For example, the plaintiffs in
Bartlett enjoyed the use of the trout stream as a recreational spot. Ac-
56. Id. at 616.
57. But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970). Here the Ninth
Circuit reached a contrary result on facts similar to those in Scenic Hudson, because
the plaintiffs failed to prove sufficiently that the construction of the Mineral King ski
resort would cause them irreparable harm. The decision is subject to criticism as
pointed out in the concurring opinion by Judge Hamley. Id. at 38. He contended
that the Sierra Club had sufficiently shown that the Mineral King project would cause
it "injury in fact," thereby satisfying the Data Processing test for standing, but he
agreed with the finding that a preliminary injunction based on the merits of the case
would amount to an abuse of discretion.
58. The purpose of the NEPA is to "promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere." NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(Supp. V, 1970). See note 10 supra.
59. See notes 62-67 & accompanying text infra.
60. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
61. Sierra Club v. Laird, Civil No. 70-78-Tuc (JAW) (D.C. Ariz., June 22, 1970).
62. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, I BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1335
(D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1970).
63. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., Civ. No.
70-82-E (N.D.W. Va., June 2, 1970).
64. Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D.
Pa. 1970).
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cordingly, they were granted standing, but relief was denied on the
grounds that the NEPA was not intended to be applied to the extent
demanded by the plaintiffs. In Zabel, commercial fishing interests were
involved, and in Sierra Club v. Laird the preservation of bird species
was among the interests to be protected. From the foregoing examples,
it is apparent that the NEPA affords protection to many varied in-
terests, the scope of which will undoubtedly be expanded by future
NEPA cases.6
C. Enforcement-Proof of Noncompliance
Once the plaintiff has attained standing to sue under the NEPA,
he must show that the agency in question has not complied with the
NEPA. The NEPA cases to date indicate that compliance has two
aspects: procedural and policy. 7
1. Procedural Noncompliance
The agency action must comply with the procedural requirements
set forth in section 102(2)(C) of the NEPA and in the Interim Guide-
lines. An agency embarking on an action that will have a significant
impact on the environment must consult with other agencies that may
have special expertise on the probable effects of the proposed action.68
The agency must then file with the President and the Council on En-
vironmental Quality a detailed statement of the environmental effects of
the proposed action and the alternatives to the action.69 This procedural
requirement has been regarded in the NEPA cases as a condition prece-
dent to issuance of a permit enabling commencement of the proposed
action. 70  For example, in Wilderness Society v. Hickel7' the Secre-
tary of the Interior was barred by a preliminary injunction from issuing
a permit to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to construct a road across
65. Sierra Club v. Laird, Civil No. 70-78-Tuc. (JAW) (D.C. Ariz., June 22,
1970).
66. E.g., Elliot v. Volpe, No. 70-869-M (D.C. Mass., filed July 6, 1970) (noise,
air and aesthetic pollution).
67. No case to date has expressly made the distinction between policy and pro-
cedural compliance, although the holdings clearly embody this distinction. See Texas
Committee v. United States, 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1303 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 1970 for an example of procedural compliance. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d
199 (5th Cir. 1970) for an example of policy compliance.
68. See note 16 & 43 supra.
69. NEPA §§ 102(2)(C)(i)-(v), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (Supp. V,
1970). See note 10 supra.
70. E.g., Texas Committee v. United States, 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Deci-
sions 1303 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1970); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, I BNA EN-V. REP.
Current Decisions 1335 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1970).
71. 1 BNA Env. Rep. Current Decisions 1335 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1970). See also
San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas, 91 S. Ct. 368, 370 (1970) (Black, Douglas
& Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
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public lands because he had not submitted to the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality the detailed statement required by section 102 (2) (c)
of the NEPA.
Enforcement of the procedural requirements of the NEPA will
probably not be a crucial problem. Agencies are beginning to comply
with these requirements in the appropriate situations as a matter of
course, 7 and once an agency has gone through the steps of procedural
compliance an action for procedural noncompliance becomes moot.
Furthermore, actions involving procedural enforcement only afford tem-
porary relief to parties interested in preserving the environment.7 1 Once
the procedural requirements have been met, the agency can issue a per-
mit without interference, provided such issuance would not be in viola-
tion of the policy requirements of the NEPA.74
2. Policy Noncompliance
Adherence to the policy set forth by the NEPA comprises the sec-
ond aspect of the compliance procedure. Enforcement of NEPA
policy promises to provide a more satisfying remedy for an aggrieved
party than does enforcement of the procedural requirements. Policy
nonncompliance litigation offers permanent relief 5 and is available after
the procedural requirements of the NEPA have been met.7 6  In addi-
tion, the numerous types of relief available to enforce NEPA policy
insure a "cure" rather than a "postponement" of the problem; for policy
violations courts can issue injunctions,77 orders requiring additional
agency consideration78 or orders requiring alternate agency action.79
Compliance with the NEPA policy involves agency discretion. An
agency must interpret its statutory authority for sponsoring an action in
72. Final statements prepared by federal agencies in accordance with section
102(2)(c) of the NEPA are on file at the Council on Environmental Quality, 722
Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.
73. For instance, a preliminary injunction seems to be the only remedy.
See Texas Committee v. United States, 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1303
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1970); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 1 BNA ENV. REP. Current
Decisions 1335 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1970).
74. See text accompanying notes 67 supra.
75. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
76. No NEPA cases have expressly stated that policy enforcement is available
after procedural enforcement has been exhausted, but it should be noted that in both
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), and in West Virginia Highlands Conserv-
ancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., Civil No. 70-82-E (N.D. W. Va., June 2, 1970), the
courts did not even consider the procedural requirements of the NEPA, and yet they
enforced the NEPA policy requirements. It is reasonable to conclude that policy en-
forcement will be available regardless of whether procedural enforcement has been
previously demanded.
77. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
78. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965).
79. See, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 436 (1966).
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accordance with the policy statements in the act,80 and it must inte-
grate the social and natural sciences with the environmental design
arts when making decisions concerning major federal actions that may
significantly affect the environment.81 This involves what the court
in Scenic Hudson called weighing all of the "relevant factors" before
making a decision to approve a projectA2
Judicial review of matters within agency discretion, as a means of
enforcing NEPA policy, is limited by section 10(c) of the APA to
agency abuses of discretion and to findings of fact not supported by
the substantial evidence.83 Consequently, courts in NEPA actions may
only overturn an agency decision if it amounts to an abuse of discre-
tion (a question of law), or if it is not supported by the substantial evi-
dence (a question of fact).8 4  An agency abuse of discretion under the
NEPA could include a failure by an agency to give adequate considera-
tion to a project's environmental impact.8 5 It could also involve agency
failure to adequately consider the alternatives to a proposed project,
which should include having no project at AIL6 Definition of what will
constitute failure to give adequate consideration to the environment or
what will constitute failure to adequately consider alternatives to a pro-
posed action will necessarily be decided on a case-by-case basis since
the NEPA applies to the vast array of agency actions which fall under
the broad rubric of "environment related." None of the NEPA cases
to date have been decided on grounds of agency abuse of discretion, but
it is probable that as environmental protection becomes increasingly ur-
gent, and as more agencies begin complying with the procedural re-
quirements of the NEPA, actions based on a theory of agency abuse of
discretion under the NEPA will become more prevalent.
Actions based on agency failure to adequately support its findings
of fact impose a heavy burden of proof upon the plaintiff, since an
agency finding that is supported by sufficient evidence to survive a di-
rected verdict will not be overturned. 7 It has been proposed, how-
ever, that due to the newness of environmental law and the lack of ex-
pertise in quantifying the environmental amenities, agency findings of
environmental facts may be reviewed not as questions of fact but as ques-
80. NEPA § 102(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (Supp. V, 1970). See note 10
supra.
81. Id. § 102(2)(A), 42U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).
82. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 612, 614 (2d
Cir. 1965). See generally Sive, supra note 6.
83. See generally Sive, supra note 6.
84. See generally id.
85. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965).
86. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1966).
87. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also
Sive, supra note 6, at 616, 617.
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tions of law.'8 Thus, the finding would be subject to the abuse-of-dis-
cretion test as opposed to the directed verdict test. Under the abuse-of-
discretion test, the plaintiffs burden of proof is substantially lessened
since he need only show that the agency misconstrued the law, a sig-
nificantly easier task. Whether this theory can be used to mitigate the
plaintiffs burden of proof has never been decided.
In any event, enforcement of the NEPA policy can be achieved
under section 10(e) of the APA by judicial review of agency findings
of law and findings of fact. If a court finds there has been an abuse of
discretion or a finding of fact not supported by the substantial evidence
within the meaning of the NEPA, it can overturn the agency finding
and order the agency to conform its decision to NEPA policy. This
might require ordering an agency to reconsider alternatives to a project,
as was done in the pre-NEPA case of Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. Federal Power Commission. 9 It might also include an
order requiring an agency to make improvements on a continuing
project, the form of relief requested in several of the pending NEPA
cases.90 Enforcement of NEPA policy could include an injunction
barring approval of a proposed project' t or possibly even the continu-
ance of an ongoing project.92 A ruling that bars continuance of an
ongoing project will, however, probably only be used in rare cases due
to economic and social factors which might render such a decision un-
reasonable.
III. Retroactive Enforcement of the NEPA
Although the NEPA will probably be judicially enforced, its mere
prospective enforcement, while a major contribution to environmental
law, leaves a gap in the environmental control effort. Applying the
NEPA only to future agency projects allows environmental degrada-
tion caused by projects commenced prior to its enactment to continue.9 3
In order to restore the environment, as called for by the policy state-
ment in the NEPA,94 existing projects must also be governed by NEPA
88. See Sive, supra note 6, at 624.
89. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
90. The California Water Plan faces demands for improved environmental pro-
tection measures. See Note, A Challenge to the California Water Plan, 22 HASTINGS
L.J. 732 (1970).
91. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
92. It would probably be unreasonable to close down a power plant or other
necessary operation, because economic and social factors outweigh the environmental
considerations. See text accompanying notes 142-47 infra. But see Los Angeles Water
& Power v. Los Angeles Air Pollution Control Dist., I BNA ENv. REP. Current Deci-
sions 1580 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 1970), where a power plant project was halted
after $6.5 million had been spent.
93. See source cited note 90 supra.
94. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
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requirements." For the law to sanction a project that is harmful to the
environment solely because the project was instituted prior to the enact-
ment of the NEPA is, at best, a tenuous proposition. Environmental
deterioration has continued to the point where it is no longer advisable
to postpone repairing the damage already done.96 Curative action is
needed to insure that the present as well as future generations will be able
to exist in "productive harmony"9 with nature.98
A. Retroactive Policy Application
Retroactive application of the NEPA cannot be predicated on prac-
tical necessity alone; there must be a legal basis as well. Generally,
courts are bound to give prospective construction to legislation because
of the unjust character of making unlawful that which was lawful when
begun.99  But the prospective application rule is not absolute. 00  The
constitutional prohibition against the making of ex post facto"' laws
does not apply to civil suits, 10 2 and thus will not constitute a bar to
retroactive application of the NEPA. Moreover, retroactive appli-
cation of a statute has been upheld when the language of the legislation
and the intent of the legislature demand such an application. 103 Un-
der this test, the policy requirements of the NEPA can arguably be ap-
plied retroactively.
The language in the NEPA, considered in toto, manifests a policy
of promoting the restoration of the environment. Section [01(a) pro-
vides that NEPA was enacted as the result of congressional recognition
of the "critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality. . . ."101 To accomplish this goal, the act expressly provides
in section 101(b) that:
95. See source cited note 90 supra.
96. "The time has come when we can wait no longer to repair the damage al-
ready done, and to establish new criteria to guide us in the future." President Nixon's
Message to Congress, Feb. 10, 1970, in 1 BNA ENv. REP. Federal Laws 21:0201
(1970).
97. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
98. See President Nixon's Message to Congress, Transmitting the Futsr AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrly, Aug. 10, 1970, in 1
BNA ENV. REP. Federal Laws 21:0217 (1970).
99. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
100. Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie
Stock Yards, 231 U.S. 190 (1913).
101. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9.
102. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
103. Greene v. United States, 377 U.S. 149 (1964); Union Pac. R.R. v. Laramie
Stock Yards, 231 U.S. 190 (1913).
104. NEPA § 101(a), 43 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added).
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[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to
use all practicable means [to improve Federal programs]. 10 5
In order to carry out this policy to the "fullest extent possible" and
by "all practicable means," it is reasonable to infer that the act is in-
tended to apply to existing programs which were commenced prior to
the enactment of the NEPA if they have a substantial adverse effect on
the environment. While the NEPA does not expressly provide for retro-
active application, the legislative history and the implicatory language
of the act evidences a congressional intent that it not be limited to pros-
pective operation. Senate Report No. 29610 stated that the NEPA:
. . . would provide all agencies and all Federal officials with a
legislative mandate and a responsibility to consider the conse-
quences of their actions on the environment. This would be true
of the licensing functions of independent agencies as well as the
ongoing activities of the regular Federal agencies.' 07
"Ongoing activities," of course, refers to continuing projects. Since all
new projects would be within the "licensing functions" of the federal
agencies, it is reasonable to conclude that "ongoing activities" refers to
already existing operations.10
The argument for retroactivity is further strengthened by Zabel
v. Tabb.1°9 In Zabel, the appellate court ruled that a project was sub-
ject to the policy requirements of the NEPA despite its commencement
prior to NEPA enactment because the correctness of the decision to pur-
sue the project must be determined by the "standards of today."1 0  To
determine the standards of today, the court looked to the national en-
vironmental policy as set forth in the NEPA.
The court in Pennsylvania Environmnental Council v. Bartlett"'
took a contrary view towards retroactive application. In that case the
court ruled that the use by Congress of the phrases "to use all prac-
tical means and resources" and "to the fullest extent possible" were
"hardly of the type which would evidence a retroactive intent.""'  This
105. Id. § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (emphasis added).
106. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
107. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 21.
109. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
110. Id. at 213.
111. 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
112. Id. at 243. There are two advance decisions which follow the view taken
in Bartlett. Brooks v. Volpe, 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1004 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 25, 1970); Investment Syndicates v. Richmond, 1 BNA ENV. REP. Current De-
cisions 1713 (D. Ore. Oct. 27, 1970). In Brooks the plaintiffs were seeking a pre-
liminary injunction to enjoin construction of proposed westbound lanes for interstate
1-90. The administrative determination which approved the project was made in
1967. The court held that the procedural requirements of NEPA § 102(C) were
not meant to be applied retroactively since the NEPA did not expressly require retro-
active application of section 102(C) nor was there any "necessary implication" re-
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ruling is an unnecessarily narrow construction of the NEPA. It is ad-
mitted that the phrases "all practicable means" and "fullest extent possi-
ble," when taken out of context, do not provide a sufficient statement
of intent that the NEPA be applied retroactively; but as previously in-
dicated,113 the legislative history points to the conclusion that these
phrases, when viewed in light of NEPA policy and the legislative intent,
do require that the NEPA be applied retroactively.
B. Retroactive Procedural Requirements
Retroactive application of the procedural requirements of the
NEPA is based on a different theory than that used to justify retroac-
tive application of the policy requirements. Although the procedural
requirements of the NEPA only refer to proposed actions,' 14 indicating
prospective intent, the Interim Guidelines have ordered:
To the fullest extent possible the Section 102(2)(C) procedure
should be applied to further major Federal actions having a signifi-
cant effect on the environment even though they arise from projects
or programs initiated prior to enactment of 91-190 [NEPA] on
January 1, 1970. Where it is not practicable to reassess the basic
course of action, it is still important that further incremental major
actions be shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental conse-
quiring it. The court failed to notice the Interim Guidelines § 11 requirement
that section 102(C) is to be applied to projects that were commenced prior to the
enactment of the NEPA providing it is practicable to do so. In view of the
court's failure to even consider the Interim Guidelines, it is suggested that the decision
is erroneous.
In Richmond the court denied a demand for a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the defendants from constructing a power line adjacent to an already existing power line.
The new line had been approved in 1967, and appropriaions for the line were near
completion before 1970. The court noted that there was little left to completion of
the project, that a preliminary injunction would cause a substantial slow-down and an
increase to the cost of the project to the tax payer's detriment, and would not lead to
permanent relief for the plaintiffs, there being no alternatives more favorable to the
plaintiffs. The court ruled in accordance with Bartlett and Brooks, that the procedural
requirements of NEPA § 102(C) were not to be applied retroactively, the validity of
which is questionable.
It should be noted that the court may have actually applied the NEPA in this case,
but found that its application did not warrant injunctive relief. The court reasoned
that it could not "believe that Congress intended that the NEPA apply to 'major Fed-
eral actions' which had reached this stage of completion as of the date of enactment.
It was not the intention of Congress to negate all of the work which had gone into
this project, including design and planning costs, but to have it completed in an orderly
manner." 315 F. Supp. at 242. Such reasoning amounts to application of the NEPA,
since application requires weighing all the factors relevant to a project, including eco-
nomic factors as in this case. Since the project was so near completion, and because
there appeared to be no substantially different or better alternatives, the project con-
formed to the requirements of -the NEPA policy. NEPA §§ 101(b)(l)-(6), 102(1)
(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(!)-6,4332(1)(A).(Supp. V, 1970).
113. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supra.
114. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V, 1970).
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quences. It is also important in further actions that account be
taken of environmental consequences not fully evaluated at the out-
set of the project or program.115
Thus, the procedural requirements of the NEPA will be applied retro-
actively to all agency actions except those where it is not practicable to
reassess the basic course of the action. Even then, any incremental
addition to such a project must comply in order to minimize environ-
mental degradation. What is "not practicable" has not yet been clearly
defined, but it seems certain that any definition of this provision must
be consistent with the desire of the legislature that no agency take an
excessively narrow interpretation of the NEPA in order to avoid com-
pliance."'
There is already some direct support for the proposition that the
procedural requirements of the NEPA may be applied retroactively in
accordance with the Interim Guidelines.'17 In Sierra Club v. Laird,"8
the court held that the Army's failure to submit an "environmental im-
pact" statement" 9 constituted a violation of the procedural requirements
of the NEPA and the Interim Guidelines. The ruling had a retroactive
effect because the project in question, the Gila River clearing project,
has been approved by Congress in 1958. There had been extensive
planning after that date, but the Army Corps of Engineers did not issue
invitations for bids on the project until April of 1970, when the NEPA
was in force. Despite this fact, the case does lend support to the conten-
tion that the NEPA procedural requirements can be retroactively en-
forced, at least to a limited degree. 120
IV. Degree of Retroactive Application
A. Due Process Considerations
If the policy and procedural requirements of the NEPA are en-
forced retroactively, in consonance with its legislative history, the In-
terim Guidelines and the already-decided cases, it becomes crucial to
determine the extent to which retroactivity can be given effect. The
case law to date suggests that the NEPA can be applied to projects that
were either approved, initiated or even completed 12 prior to the en-
115. Interim Guidelines, supra note 15, § 11 (emphasis added).
116. See note 51 supra.
117. Sierra Club v. Laird, Civil No. 70-78-Tuc. (JAW) (D.C. Ariz. June 22,
1970).
118. Id.
119. See NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V, 1970); Interim
Guidelines, supra note 15, § 11.
120. See text accompanying notes 121-49 infra.
121. There have been no NEPA cases involving the discontinuance of a com-
pleted project, but many analogous cases support the contention that completed projects
are subject to discontinuance if they fail to comply with the NEPA. See cases cited
note 122 infra.
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actment of the NEPA. 22
The extent to which the NEPA can legally be applied to existing
projects depends primarily on whether retroactive application would
constitute a compensable taking under the 5th amendment,1 23 or
whether it is merely a regulation of property rights within the scope of
due process.12 4 In federal cases, when a law is applied to enjoin a party
from continuing his present operation, he generally argues either that
he should be compensated pursuant to the 5th amendment, or that ap-
plication of the law is a deprivation or taking of property without due
process of law as guaranteed by the 5th amendment.1 5 The accepted
definition of "taking" under federal law, however, does not inlude the
regulation or the prohibition of an existing use.' 26  For example, in
United States v. Willow River Power Co.,'27 the Supreme Court ruled
that the construction of a dam which substantially diminished the com-
plainant's economic interest in his power plant was not a compensable
taking within the meaning of the 5th amendment.
The rule of Willow River is not without limitations. The general
rule derived from the case law is that a regulation or prohibition of the
use of property, including requirements to improve the property for
public protection, 128 is not considered a compensable taking or a viola-
tion of due process provided that the regulation or prohibition promotes
the public health, morals, safety or general welfare, and is not arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable.129  This is true even if the owner's rights in
the property are rendered valueless, 30 or if he has substantially relied
on the continued use of his property for a specified purpose.13'
Retroactive application of the NEPA is clearly in the interest of
122. Under Federal law there appears to be no distinction made between an
existing use and a proposed use of property in regulatory actions. Neither is subject to
compensation under the fifth amendment. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324" U.S. 499 (1945).
But see Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598
(1958); Town of Hempstead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315, 226 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
123. "No person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
124. See generally Sax Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J 36 (1964).
125. Id. at 49.
126. See cases cited note 122 supra.
127. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
128. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346
(1949).
129. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). But see
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
130. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
131. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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public health and welfare."8 2 The language of the act itself declares
that the environment must be preserved in order to protect public
health.133 Environmental regulation under the NEPA is also justifiably
within the scope of due process, because the present and predicted en-
vironmental conditions render such regulation reasonable:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional [due process] guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract
to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world,
it is impossible that it should be otherwise.' 34
There are no cases to date in which a complainant has attempted
to apply the NEPA to a project that was completed prior to the enact-
ment of the statute. The NEPA has been applied, however, to actions
where the project was approved prior to its enactment. In Zabet v.
Tabb, 3 5 the litigation over a permit denial was commenced prior to
the NEPA enactment, but the NEPA was subsequently held applicable.
In Texas Committee v. United States,'36 a permit allowing the construc-
tion of a golf course was issued prior to NEPA enactment, but was held
subject to review under the NEPA. In that case, the Federal Housing
Administration was ordered to comply with the procedural requirements
of the NEPA before granting a permit, even though a permit had origi-
nally been granted prior to the enactment of the NEPA. In Sierra
Club v. Laird,' the NEPA procedural requirements were held to ap-
ply to a project that was approved in 1968.
In Pennsylvania Environnmental Council v. Bartlett, 38 the court
found that because construction had started prior to the enactment of
the NEPA, the action was distinguishable from a case where only the
"processing of papers" had occurred prior to passage of the statute.139
The court held that the project in question was therefore immune from
NEPA application; this distinction is questionable, however, since the
analogous case law makes no distinction between existing uses and po-
tential uses. 4 ' Future NEPA cases will presumably bear this out, en-
abling NEPA application to projects that were either approved, initiated
or even completed prior to its enactment.14 '
132. NEPA § 101(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
133. ld., 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b) (2).
134. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 359, 357 (1926).
135. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
136. 1 BNA ENV. REP. Current Decisions 1303 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1970).
137. Civil No. 70-82-Tuc. (JAW) (D.C. Ariz., June 23, 1970).
138. 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
139. Texas Comm. v. United States, 1 BNA ENv. REP. Current Decisions 1303
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1970).
140. See note 122 supra.
141. See, e.g., Note, A Challenge to the California Water Plan, 22 Hastings UJ.
732 (1971).
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B. Conflicting Interests
Application of the NEPA requires consideration not only of en-
vironmental objectives, but of economic and social goals as well.14 2
Noncompliance only results when the envnironmental consequences of a
project outweigh corresponding social and economic factors to the ex-
tent that the supervising agency has committed an abuse of discretion
by allowing the project to continue. 43  The NEPA specifically enu-
merates the environmental objectives that the government, by using all
practicable means consistent with other national goals, is responsible
for attaining:
(1) [to] fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) [to] assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) [to] attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
ment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other unde-
sirable and unintended consequences;
(4) [to] preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects
of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an en-
vironment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;(5) [to] achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of
life's amenities; and
(6) [to] enhance the quality of renewable resources and ap-
proach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.' 44
The national environmental, social and economic objectives per-
taining to a single project obviously will not always be in harmony. For
example, a project such as the supersonic transport may not be in keep-
ing with the national policy of assuring for all Americans a healthful
environment.14 5 It may nevertheless be consistent with the NEPA ob-
jectives if the economic factors override the necessity for environmen-
tal preservation.'4 6 If, on the other hand, national economic needs do
142. NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
143. See text accompanying notes 26-52, 75-92 supra.
144. NEPA § 101(b)(1)-(6), 42 U.S.C. H9 4331(b)(1)-(6) (Supp. V, 1970).
145. Id. § 101(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2).
146. The current debate over whether Congress should continue to subsidize the
SST program is an excellent example of the recent emphasis placed on environmental
factors in congressional decisions. On December 3, 1970, the Senate voted 51 to 42 to
deny the project a $290 million appropriation. 116 CONG. REc. 19,389 (daily ed.
Dec. 3, 1970). The Senate reached a compromise with the House on January 2, 1971,
by adopting House Joint Resolution 1421, which provided a temporary continuance of
the SST until March 30, 1971. H.R.J. Res. 1421, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG.
REc. 21,779 (1971).
It should be noted that Senator Muskie from Maine argued that the SST, as a
continuing project was in violation of the NEPA § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (Supp.
V, 1970), because the Secretary of Transportation failed to file the requisite detailed
statement with the Council on Environmental Quality, and because the Secretary re-
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not supersede the need for environmental protection, a court would be
justified in ordering a cessation of the project on the grounds that it vio-
lates the NEPA.
It should be noted that a project's stage of progress will certainly
have a direct bearing on the weight given to economic considerations in
an action to bar continuance of the project. Presumably, the economic
losses sustained when a completed project is barred from continuing
operation will be sustantially greater than those sustained when a project
is barred in the initial stages of development. Projects in the initial
stages of development will be more amenable to charges that they vio-
late the NEPA, simply because environmental considerations will out-
weigh the economic costs of bringing the project into conformity with
NEPA requirement. The act's directive that the government use "all
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of
policy, 1' 7 to meet the environmental goals set by the NEPA, should
insure that economic and social costs of pollution abatement are given
adequate consideration.
C. Incremental Action
There is an additional theory which will permit retroactive effect
to be given to the NEPA without regard to the compensable-taking ob-
jection. It pertains to further major incremental 4  actions which
change, enlarge or continue existing projects. An incremental action,
although not yet clearly defined, is presumably an addition, alteration
or possibly even a renewal license granted to an existing agency project.
It is arguable that application of the NEPA policy to proposed incre-
mental action is not retroactive application at all. Although a project
might be completed prior to the enactment of the NEPA, a proposal
to take an incremental action, including a proposal to secure a renewal
of the project, can be considered sufficiently separate from the original
fused to give to Congress, before the vote, the Department of Transportation findings
regarding the SST. 11 CONG. REC. 19,389 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1970). Such a failure,
he argued, should be grounds to at least stall the project until section 102(C) is com-
plied with. This type of application would be retroactive, since the SST was com-
menced before the NEPA was enacted. But see text accompanying notes 148-50 supra.
Ironically, Senator Jackson of Washington, an author of the NEPA, voted for the
SST appropriation. Id. 19,389. It must be pointed out, however, that the State of
Washington would have reaped the benefits of the appropriation, since the Boeing
Company, the SST contractor, is located in Seattle.
Russel Train, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, came out
against the SST because of the harmful effects on the environment that the project
could possibly produce. Id. at 19, 373. He has reported, however, that development
of prototypes of the SST would have no affect on the environment. 116 CONG. REc.
20,351 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1970).
147. NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (Supp. V, 1970) (emphasis added).
148. Interim Guidelines, supra note 15, § 11.
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project to warrant prospective NEPA application. The Interim Guide-
lines support this theory by requiring agencies to meet the procedural
requirements of the NEPA for incremental actions when it is imprac-
tical for the agency to reassess the basic course of an action that was
commenced prior to the enactment of the NEPA. 149  Thus, the NEPA
could be applied in these instances without actually being applied retro-
actively, and such prospective application would not be subject to the
compensable-taking argument.150
V. Conclusion
Despite the failure of the NEPA to provide provisions for its en-
forcement, its legislative history, the Interim Guidelines, the NEPA
cases to date and the common law indicate that the NEPA can be en-
forced and can even be given retroactive effect. Enforcement of the
NEPA will promote careful consideration by state and federal agen-
cies of the environmental affects of their actions; it will require them to
improve existing projects and in extreme cases might result in an injunc-
tion barring continuance of an existing operation. Even where prohibi-
tion of an existing use is deemed unreasonable, the NEPA could still be
149. Id.
150. An alternate theory which will permit retroactive effect to be given to the
NEPA involves the incorporation of NEPA policy into the elements of the private
nuisance action. See 79 YALE L.J. 102 (1969). The theory is based on the analogy be-
tween the agency decision-making process under the NEPA and the court decision-
making process in a private nuisance action. To comply with the NEPA policy, agen-
cies must weigh environmental, social, and economic factors before deciding on a pro-
posed action. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970). In a
private nuisance action, a court must weigh these same factors as part of the circum-
stances to determine the unreasonableness of the defendant's invasion of the plaintiff's
right to enjoy the use of his property. See PROSSER, supra note 7, § 90, at 611.
In the past, environmental factors in private nuisance actions have been subordi-
nate to other factors considered by the courts. HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 7.33. See
also Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLum. L. REV. 734 (1970).
Although water pollution (PRossER § 90, at 612 n.99) and air pollution (Id. § 90, at
612 nn.4, 5, 8) were considered adequate grounds for granting an injunction under a
nuisance theory, these factors were considered only in their relation to the private own-
er's interest in his property. See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 7.33. They were not
considered in relation to the owner's interest in maintaining his property in a manner
consistent with a policy of protecting the overall environment. In view of the strong
statement of national policy in the NEPA, the environment is now a major factor to be
considered in judicial or agency decisions which may significantly affect the environ-
ment. Accordingly, under the "standards of today" (Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir. 1970)) courts in nuisance actions should expand the scope of the interests to be
given protection to include the protection of the environment, where applicable, in
determining the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. If the courts were to adopt
this reasoning in private nuisance actions, the NEPA would, in effect, be applied retro-
actively, but without fear of a compensable taking argument thwarting its application.
See text accompanying notes 121-41 supra.
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applied to further incremental actions and possibly to renewals related
to that use. In addition, NEPA policy could conceivably alter the tra-
ditional concept of reasonableness in private nuisance actions to include
added emphasis on environmental factors.151
The NEPA has contributed to environmental law not only as a
new cause of action, but as a cause of action that includes all types of
environmental problems and all federal agencies. The NEPA will
therefore be valuable as a supplement to other environmental statutes.
In light of the existing law and the need for environmental reform, it
is urged that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 be applied
to projects commenced prior to its enactment.
Stewart S. Mims*
151. See note 150 supra.
* Member, Second Year Class.


